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Meaning and Mental Representation, by Robert Cummins. Cambridge: MIT 
Tress, 1989. 180 pages. Reviewed by David Larson, Central Missouri State 
University. 
Representations arc semantic entities. This means that they, like 
propositions, carry truth values-or maybe it means that they, like 
predicates, enter into constructions which carry truth values. Cummins uses 
the term 'representation' both for entities which have truth-valued 
semantic contents such as the content that Brutus had flat feet, and for 
predicate-like entities having values such as cat. At any rate, the topic is 
that of mental entities with semantic value. 
In spite of the title, the book is not about meaning. Cummins takes 
pains to avoid cither relying on or attempting to explain folk 
psychological notions of meaning, intention, belief, desire, etc. He rejects 
Fodor's view that representations are ordinary meanings—the objects of 
intention, belief, and desire. 
Cummins says that his topic is part of philosophy of science. It is a 
task in the philosophy of science to sec whether good sense can be made of 
the notion of representation employed by the computational theory of 
cognition, an empirical scientific theory. (Actually, to speak of a scientific 
theory here is to be too generous, for no large cognitive tasks have yet been 
rendered computational, but we might fairly speak of an empirical 
research program.) Cummins relics heavily on assumptions peculiar to this 
theory in rejecting some accounts of the nature of representation and in 
defending his preferred account. 
A successful computational theory of cognition would explain the 
activity of a cognitive system (whether human, canine, Martian, or 
whatever) by rcductively describing it as computation on representations. 
What sort of sense, then, can be made of this notion of representation? 
Similarity between representation and thing represented, at this point in 
philosophic history, docs not appear very attractive as an analysis of the 
nature of representation, and Cummins briefly recounts the huge difficulties 
for this analysis posed by mis-rcprcscntation and by representation of 
abstractions. Another analysis of the nature of representation, one version 
of which is attributable to Ruth Millikan, is that of evolutionary, or 
adaptational role semantics. This account has it roughly that 
representational content is determined by the survival v a l t j of the 
representation, but the explicitly historical nature of this account renders 
it incompatible with the computational theory of cognition. 
Mis-representation, or error, is a problem not only for the unattractive 
similarity account of representation, but also for causal accounts, such as 
those offered by Fodor and Drctskc. The basic difficulty is widely 
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appreciated, but Cummins argues a) that there is really only one dodge 
possible, b) that the dodge is unsuccessful, and c) that even sophisticated 
causal accounts therefore fall on the difficulty. 
Mis-representation is a difficulty for naive causal accounts of the 
nature of representation because these accounts explain the content of a 
representation by citing the cause of the representation. Thus, the catty 
content of one representation might be explained by the fact that 
occurrences of that representation arc caused by cats, while the doggy 
content of another representation is explained by its occurrences being 
caused by dogs. If mis-representation is possible, however, as it obviously 
is, then the naive account cannot be right. In cases of mis-representation, a 
representation with, for instance, a catty content is caused by a non-cat. If 
representation were only causality, then there could be no mis-
representation. 
Sophisticated causal accounts, Cummins argues, have no choice but to 
go ideal to dodge the difficulty. They must try to explain representational 
content by saying what would, given ideal cognitive operation and/or ideal 
epistemic conditions, cause the representation. The idea is that a theory 
might spell out constraints under which a cognitive system would be 
infallible, not because of an interest in infallibility as such, but because of 
the need to get representation established. 
Idealized causal accounts do not explain the nature of representation 
unless they manage to spell out the idealizing constraints without 
circularity and without the use of semantic concepts. Cummins considers 
the project hopeless. His account of Dretskc's attempts finds Dretske 
circularly presupposing the very semantic concepts which representation 
should eventually help explain. 
Fodor's solution, or one of them, grants that the necessary constraints 
(describing the conditions which set content) arc epistemic and hence 
presuppose semantic concepts, but denies that these constraints need to be 
spelled out. Satisfaction of these constraints is all that is needed to set 
content, and pointing out (without spelling them out, even in outline) that 
these constraints must be satisfied is all that is needed to explain 
representation. Cummins reasonably objects that this amounts to an 
admission of defeat. If the constraints necessarily satisfied for 
representation presuppose epistemic notions, then representation cannot 
help explain semantic notions. 
As an alternative, Cummins finds in standard descriptions of 
calculating devices (computational theories of non-cognitive machines) an 
innocuous (naturalistic or non-intentional) notion of representation which 
doesn't need to be explained, yet is adequate for the computational theory 
of cognition. What is it, Cummins asks, that makes a certain display state 
of a calculator representative of the number four? It is simply that that 
display state has a certain role in the functioning of the calculator. Were 
it not for the other states and processes of the calculator, this state would 
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not represent the number four or anything else. Because the button pressings 
and displays of the calculator, suitably interpreted, perfectly "track" 
arithmetic functions, those buttons and displays actually represent the 
numbers and operators which arc their interpretations. 
Cummins calls his account of representation "intcrprctational 
semantics". An interpretation, of course, is just a mapping of one set 
(symbols) into another (content). As such, the notion of an interpretation is 
unproblcmatic. But Cummins does not simply identify representation with 
interpretation—not all interpretation yields representation. On Cummins' 
account, it is only when a computation successfully tracks (is isomorphic to) 
the target function that symbols represent anything. Instead of 
"intcrprctational semantics", this might better be called "successful 
tracking semantics". 
The reason Cummins finds no problem with mis-rcprcscntation, it 
seems to mc, is that he is not bothered by radical ambiguity. By way of 
contrast, Fodor considers mis-rcprcscntation a problem because he would 
give representations unique contents. Fodor is forced to worry about mis-
representation of cats turning into representation of the disjunctive cats or 
dogs because he cannot allow one representation to have both catty and 
disjunctive contents. It takes work to keep a causal theory from selecting 
the disjunctive content, and this is work which Fodor undertakes. Cummins 
contends that intcrprctational semantics does not need to do this work-
disambiguation is not necessary. Intcrprctational semantics needs only to 
be able to talk about more or less successful tracking, and can remain 
untroubled by the fact that what is fairly successful tracking of one function 
is inevitably more successful tracking of another. Representation occurs 
with respect to both functions. 
It seems to me that there is more to the "unproblcmatic" notion of 
representation employed in talking about calculators and adding machines 
than Cummins recognizes. Calculator displays represent numbers and not 
assorted shingles on my roof, regardless of the possibility of assigning the 
second interpretation. Wc should distinguish not only between what is 
represented and what was intended to be represented, as Cummins docs, but 
also between what is represented and what could have been represented. 
Calculator displays do represent numbers, though they are doubtless suited 
to the representation of many other things as well. If Cummins' account 
stays naturalistic it will offer, it seems to mc, only an explanation of 
suitability for representation, not an explanation of representation. In 
other words, it will offer, at most, a necessary condition on representation. 
Furthermore, since there arc degrees of success, and representation can occur 
even without perfect success, it would appear that this necessary condition 
can only be vaguely stated in terms of more or less successful tracking. 
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The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger, by 
Richard Wolin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 221 pp. 
Reviewed by Patricia J. Huntington, Fbrdham University 
Lucidly written and rigorously argued, Wolin's The Politics of Being* 
examines the manner in which Heidegger's political convictions were 
embedded in and prepared for by his philosophy. Employing a Kantian 
methodology to explore Heidegger's thought for the conditions of 
possibility of his political engagement, Wolin attempts to compensate for 
two deficiencies in the existing literature on the subject. On the one hand, 
historical accounts of Heidegger's empirical commitment to National 
Socialism lack the moment of "philosophical specificity" requisite to 
exemplify the theoretical basis of this commitment (xv). On the other 
hand, most conceptual analyses of Heidegger's political thought, in 
proceeding ahistorically, fail to challenge the "self-evidence" and 
supposed ideological neutrality of his basic philosophical categories (xiv). 
Situating the conceptual development of Heidegger's philosophy in its 
historical context, Wolin undertakes an immanent analysis aimed at 
exposing the inherently flawed character of Heidegger's political 
thought.2 
Despite the hopeful formulation of and careful research underlying 
this project, it fails to fully achieve this aim. Certainly successful in 
revealing that Heidegger's philosophy does not rule out a priori a 
totalitarian political agenda, Wolin docs not succeed in 'philosophically 
specifying' the exact nature of the theoretical deficiencies at root of 
Heidegger's political action. Wolin's usage of Kantian method, 
unbalanced by a study of the conceptual heritage influencing Heidegger, 
generates an ovcrdctcrmined reading of historiography back into thought. 
1 Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin 
Heidegger (NY: Columbia University Press, 1990). All pagination in the 
main body of this paper refers to this book. 
2 Wolin envisions his work as "the philosophical pendant to Pierre 
Dourdicu's sociological study," L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger 
(Paris: Editions dc Minuit, 1988) |xv|, introducing the philosophical 
moment into this work as well as two other works, largely biographical in 
import: Victor Farias, Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus, with a 
foreword by jiirgen Habcrmas (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1989) (This is an 
expanded version of Heidegger et le Nazisme. Trans. Myriam Ocnarroch 
and Jcan-Baptistc Crassct (Lagrassc: Editions Vcrdicr, 1987)1; and Hugo 
Ott, Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographic (Frankfurt: 
Campus, 1988). On the other end of the spectrum, most Heidegger scholars 
in France, Germany and the USA have given apolitical readings of 
Heidegger's work for several decades. Wolin will focus on Jacques Derrida 
and Phillipc Lacoue-Labarthc, cf. n 5 below. 
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Instead of examining the manner in which the conceptual framework of 
Heideggerian thought critically transcends Heidegger's political action, 
Wolin simply reads his philosophy as part and parcel of his politics. This 
conceptual lack not only proves, in my opinion, a serious omission in a work 
that promises an immanent critique, but renders his analysis inconclusive. 
Tainted by his own political interests, Wolin's interpretation of Heidegger 
places his work too close to those historical analyses he claims offer 
unfounded speculative explications of Heidegger's empirical action.3 
In what follows I will focus on how Wolin's serious misreading of key 
aspects of the Hcidcggerian texts problcmatizcs the conclusions he draws. 
The thesis that Heidegger's political thought is flawed can be 
substantiated by demonstrating that the 1933 decision for National 
Socialism flowed from the "innermost tendencies" of Being and Time (66).* 
Toward this end, Wolin undertakes a two-stringed analysis of Being and 
Time, focusing on methodology and the concept of Mitsein (Bcing-with), in 
order to expose the manner in which ideology and philosophy fuse into a 
viewpoint theoretically consistent with the conservative-
authoritarianism of Heidegger's day. 
First, despite the attempt to break with subjectivism. Being and Time 
advances a theory of decisionism that, in turn, issues in a collcctivist view 
of practical life. According to Wolin, Dasein can only achieve authenticity 
by "repudiating the public" realm of evcrydayness (36). Rejecting 
traditional normative criteria for action-criteria both Heidegger and the 
conservative revolutionaries deemed bankrupt inasmuch as modernity 
stands under the sway of nihilism—Heidegger valorizes the mere act of 
resolute decision. Yet this valorization leads to the aporia of decisionism, 
viz. that Dasein, because the act of decision is empty in itself, can only find 
meaning in bearing up under the collective destiny of tNs Volk. 
Heidegger's analysis of Mitsein amounts at most to a self-canceling social 
ontology. Situated in the ethical vacuum of modernity, Daseit. must find 
the content of the "authentic destiny of the people" among those political 
options historically available (65). 
Second, that Heidegger regarded National Socialism as the most 
viable "filling" of the empty vessel of decision available in his day was 
not, Wolin argues, incidental to his philosophy (66). The flawed 
methodology of Being and Time prevents Heidegger's thought from the 
3 It should be noted that Wolin's project reflects the strong influence of 
Jurgcn Habermas, under whom Wolin studied in Germany, both in its 
general conceptual formulation and in terms of interpretation. Yet 
Habermas' interpretation of Heidegger is tendentious due to his polemic 
with all who participated in fascist Germany. Wolin proves too good a 
student of Habermas in that he inherits the biases of his mentor. 
4 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (NY: Harper & Row, 1962). 
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attainment of ontological purity. Due to the impossibility of undertaking 
an existential version of Kant's transcendental turn, the categories of Being 
and Time (e.g. authenticity, everydayness, fallcnncss, angst, resolve, 
destiny), reflect the cultural and historical biases that Heidegger shared 
with the conservative intelligentsia of his day (21). These included 
minimally the valorization of decisionism, denigration of the life-world, 
the antimodcrnist rejection of all inherited moral conventions, and the 
belief in the special destiny of the German Volk—all of which find 
theoretical cogency with the treatment of Mitsein. Fusing ideology with 
philosophy, Heidegger's thought devolves into a conservative-
authoritarian world-view, one which, because devoid of the liberal 
democratic inheritance of modernity, lacked an "ethico-political bulwark 
against the enticement of fascism" (65). 
Aspects of Wolin's analysis are incisive and deserve close attention. 
He accurately questions the problematic methodology of Being and Time as 
well as the personal and historical biases influencing this work. And, 
despite inaccuracies of interpretation, Wolin's general analysis often 
returns the reader to the text with an enriched, more critical eye. This 
holds especially true of his treatment of historicity and destiny. Yet the 
keystone in Wolin's argument, viz. that the crucially flawed rejection of 
liberal democratic values was grounded in the aporia of decisionism, rests 
on a serious misinterpretation of the concepts of authenticity and Mitsein. 
Wolin mistakenly reads Heidegger's critique of everydayness as a 
total denigration of the life-world because he omits an examination of the 
Augustinian-Kierkegaardian spiritualist tradition that so heavily 
influences this discussion. The concern with collapse into everydayness is 
not a denigration of the life-world per se, but rather a concern to live in a 
qualitatively transformed relation to the world. Heidegger is well aware 
that there is no getting out of the existcnticll world of the evcryday-this 
is the context of human existence. He simply recognizes that there arc 
minimally two ways to inhabit the life-world: (i) cither one can 
unconsciously drift along with the gravitational momentum of inherited 
traditions, perpetuating them, yes, but only dogmatically; (ii) or, by 
questioning,this inheritance, one can relate critically to tradition. 
Analogously, Heidegger's concept of authenticity docs not 'repudiate 
the public' world of everydayness, thereby retreating into the 'empty' 
inferiority of individual Dasein and its arbitrary will. Authenticity 
constitutes a transformed mode of Mitsein. The entire analysis of Bcing-
with already moves beyond the dialectic 'individual-collective' 
Authenticity can't leave off the intcrsubjcctivc character of Dasein or the 
contextual character of life; it marks a transformed mode of Bcing-with, 
not a departure therefrom. 
Now, it cannot be denied that Heidegger did personally reject liberal 
values and did accept the conservative political ideology of his time. My 
critique of Wolin neither undermines the claim that Heidegger's 
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philosophy provided support for his empirical convictions nor denies the 
questionable nature of key Hcidcggcrian concepts from a political 
perspective. Yet, Wolin can't locate the theoretical flaw in Heidegger's 
viewpoint specifically in 'decisionism' and 'denigration of the life-world' 
on the basis of misconstruing the text. Without accurately identifying the 
'decisionistic' nature of authenticity, Wolin docs not provide a definitive 
account of the actual link between thought and empirical conviction. He 
thus deprives us of the possibility of introducing a corrective into 
Heidegger's thought and leaves the reader with the fallacious sense that 
Heidegger's thought could only give birth to a fascistic politics, despite 
Wolin's occasional comment that he intends no such implication. 
Nonetheless, Wolin advances a broader thesis throughout most of his 
work, viz. that the fundamental lack of material concretion in Heidegger's 
thought leads to a politically flawed rejection of modernity. Thus 
extending his thesis beyond the analysis of Mitsein, Wolin argues that 
Heidegger's conservative ideology solidifies into a Seinspolitik (politics 
of Being) between 1929 and 1933 (12). Analyzing the political situation 
from the historico-mctaphysical perspective of his doctrine of 
Seinsgeschichte (History of Being), Heidegger diagnoses the loss of values 
rampant in modernity as rooted in the forgctfulness of Being. This 
diagnosis leads him to reject all historical-material solutions to political 
issues (for such accounts, premised upon the perspective of "ndividual 
agents and not Being, stand under the sway of nihilism) and to embrace a 
totalitarian view of the state. Only the state, operating under a higher 
ontological perspective, can function as the veritable midwife of Being, 
thereby restoring values to the west (112). 
Against mis background, the main thrust of Wolin's study centers on 
exhibiting the manner in which Heidegger's politics becomes increasingly 
inadequate the more his thought shifts away from the practical 
philosophy of resolute (albeit decisionistic) action in Being and Time to an 
historico-mctaphysical perspective of reality. Without addressing the 
middle period, I will focus on Wolin's concluding chapter, devoted to a 
critique of the late works. Here Wolin wishes to repudiate those who, 
while admitting the political defects in the early works, attempt to 
vindicate the philosophy of later Heidegger.5 According to Wolin's 
interpretation, the pseudo-concrete historico-mctaphysical interpretive 
framework yields a twofold outcome in the late works: (i) it functions as a 
strategy of denial, an attempt at political cover-up and (ii), by rendering 
Heidegger's philosophy devoid of all resources for practical philosophy, 
5 Although applicable to a wide range of studies, Wolin's critique focuses 
on: Jacques Dcrrida, "Heidegger: I'cnfcr des philosophcs." Le Nouvel 
Obsevateur, November 6-12 (1987) 170-74; Phillipc Lacouc-Labarthc, La 
fiction du politique. (Strasbourg: Associations des Universitcs dc 
Strasbourg, 19^87). 
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it results in a thoroughly hctcronomous, antimodcrnist, counter-
enlightenment and antihumanistic theory (147-160). 
Wolin . <gards Heidegger's development of the notion of Gelassenheit 
as a disavowal of the concepts of agency and freedom. Under such a 
disavowal, Heidegger did not have to apologize for his moral ineptitude 
in 1933 since Being, not a human agent, was responsible for the events that 
transpired. In addition, since the concepts of agency and freedom arc 
essential to moral theory, Gelassenheit issues in the total eclipse of 
practical philosophy. Without freedom, claims Wolin, humans arc not 
agents and can have no moral responsibility. The quictistic, passive 
character of Gelassenheit, in which Being and the gods dominate human 
existence, leaves no room for responsible agents finding humanly possible 
solutions to their circumstance. Failing to broaden the rational basis of 
moral agency, Heidegger opts for poetical dwelling instead of rational 
solutions to material concerns; he mis-diagnoses modernity as having an 
excess as opposed to "dearth of reason" (167). His turn to Gelassenheit 
covers over and evades the fact of his moral failure, such that Heidegger 
never once in public denounced or apologized for his involvement with 
National. Socialism. 
I cannot emphasize sufficiently my complete agreement with Wolin 
that Heidegger's philosophy on the whole, and not simply his political 
thought, stands in need of a corrective on the side of material concretion. 
Yet I disagree that Heidegger's critique of modernity constitutes per sc an 
'inherently flawed' political perspective. While Heidegger's Seinspolitk 
proves a deficient perspective from which to analyze socio-political 
circumstance, large-scale analyses are not, in principle, deficient on this 
account. In fact, it is crucial for many marginalized to understand the 
large-scale level at which systems of thought underlie particular forms of 
material injustices. Nor is Heidegger's rejection of liberal values in 
principle problematic. Granted a material analysis would help prevent an 
uniformed digression behind the lessons of modernity. Yet Wolin's tacit 
assumption that a concrete material analysis of the life-world would of 
necessity accept the inheritance of liberal modernity dots not hold, e.g. for 
the material oppression of women thematized by feminist critics of 
liberalism.6 
6 E.g. the French feminists perform such large-scale analyses when they 
explore the level at which discourse is constituted, i.e. when they uncover 
the arche underlying the scxualization of discourse across gender lines as 
embedded in the entire history of western (europcan) philosophy. 
Working at a mcta-lcvel, so to speak, docs not render their analyses 
impertinent to material oppression let alone conservative or reactionary. 
For feminist rejections of the liberal inheritance of modernity, sec 
Roscmaric Tong, Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction 
(Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1989) passim, csp. chap. 1. 
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7 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, trans. William 
Lovitt (NY: Harper & Row, 1977), sec the essay of the same title, pp. 1-35. 
8 T o give Wolin his due, he docs claim throughout that while Heidegger's 
thought docs not preclude a fascistic politic it is not reducible to this 
political agenda. Yet Wolin never cashed this claim out con ;ptually. 
Since his analysis remains one-sided in establishing a strong link between 
totalitarianism and Heidegger's philosophy it is hard to imagine what 
this could mean for Wolin. 
Despite Heidegger's personal anti-modern political commitment, his 
theoretical critique of modernity stands in a complex relation to the 
Enlightenment. jllate Heidegger's works do address an important dimension 
of concretion, viz. the systemic level at which conceptual frameworks 
oppress. Inherent in his thought arc resources, albeit undeveloped by 
Heidegger, for a critique of the manner in which the liberal inheritance of 
modernity has systcmically oppressed women and others who stand outside 
the dominant (white) patriarchal tradition. 
Moreover, the non-material character of Heidegger's thought does not 
lead, as Wolin states, to deficient concepts of rationality and agency that 
result in political hetcronomy. As with his analysis of Being and Time 
Wolin misconstrues the Hcidcggcrian critiques of rationality and agency. 
Heidegger's philosophy broadens both what has been a masculinist concept 
of rationality—a point Wolin wholly misses in claiming that Heidegger 
rules out rationality altogether—and the concept of human agency 
underlying masculinist moral theory. Wolin-glosses over this lat»cr point 
by ignoring entirely the strong concept of freedom delineated in The 
Question Concerning Technology.7 Finally, Wolin's apparent inability to 
read Celassenheit as a positive concept of autonomy, understood in terms of 
receptivity and not passivity (quiescence, quietism, etc.), appears to reflect 
his own masculinist biases. Had Wolin explored the tension in Heidegger's 
thought between its anti- and post-modern strains—strains that 
simultaneously admit conservative empirical interests and avail us a 
political corrective to the biases of modernity—he couldn't have justified 
his strong thesis that Heidegger's thought is inherently deficient with 
respect to all dimensions of the political.8 
Nonetheless, Wolin's intimation that the doctrine of Seinsgeschichte 
proves a dubious vantage point from which to interpret the socio-political 
realm is not without warrant. My suggestion is that there lies embedded in 
Heidegger's vision of history a deterministic undercurrent that, left 
uncorrected by a materialist analysis, lends itself to the disturbing 
political tendencies which rightly dismay Wolin. Because this 
deterministic strain literally operates against the potentially sound and 
liberating aspects of Heidegger's philosophy, one must be especially 
careful to properly comprehend the theoretical concerns of his thought 
before throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Wolin simply fails to 
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do this kind of conceptual work. Focusing exclusively on decisionism, 
rejection of liberal values, inadequate moral theory and such concerns, 
Wolin never examines explicitly Heidegger's theory of history. 
All criticism notwithstanding, Wolin's work constitutes a highly 
instructive analysis in that it docs not leave the reader naive about the 
political climate in which Heidegger's philosophy grew. In this sense 
alone, Wolin grants the American audience a truly needed study. Wolin's 
work brings one to recognize that any attempt to extract, toward political 
ends, the sound aspects of Heidegger's critique of modernity must introduce 
restraints into such a critique that would prevent a conservative backlash. 
Still, the beginning reader of Heidegger should be careful to avoid 
uncritical acceptance of Wolin's depiction of Heidegger's philosophy as 
essentially antihumanistic, latently authoritarian and devoid of a concept 
of rational autonomy. Toward this end, the reader needs to study works 
more sympathetic to the spirit of Hcidcggcrian thought, including those 
Wolin believes he repudiates. 
Critical Theory and Philosophy, by David Ingram. New York: Paragon 
House, 1990. 240 pages. Reviewed by George A. Trey, Loyola University of 
Chicago. 
David Ingram is best known, in scholarly circles, for his Habermas and 
the Dialectic of Reason, as well as numerous articles on critical theory and 
contemporary French social philosophy. In his most recent book, Critical 
Theory and Philosophy, Ingram's work moves in a different direction. 
Rather than dealing with complex issues that are internal to debates in 
contemporary theory, this book attends to equally complex concerns that 
need to be understood in order for those debates to begin making sense. 
Anyone who has attempted to crack the codes of philosophers such as 
Hcrbet Marcuse, Theodor Adomo, Max Horkhcimcr and Juergcn Habermas 
knows that a rather expansive knowledge of German thought, from Kant to 
the present, is presupposed. This creates a fundamental gap between 
reader and text which leads to confusion and often misunderstanding. The 
purpose of Critical Theory and Philosophy is to bridge that gap by 
providing relevant discussion of important historical figures and showing 
how they continue to influence contemporary critical social theory. 
A number of books are now available on the genesis and development of 
the "Frankfurt School." They tend to address this topic in one of two way: 
cither through an intellectual history that spans form the late 1920's to 
the most recent work of Habermas, or by critically assessing the socio-
philosophical implications of the work of recent critical theorists. 
Ingram's task is quite different. He says about the book: 
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Critical Theory and Philosophy is intended to p r o v i d e an 
accessible introduction to s o m e of the major figures and 
themes of the Frankfurt School. It is primarily directed 
toward u n d e r g r a d u a t e and graduate students w h o have 
little o r no familiarity with the G e r m a n philosophical 
tradition informing its heritage. At the s a m e t i m e it 
presents a coherent a r g u m e n t that will n o d o u b t be of 
interest to those already conversant with this tradition 
( X V ) . 
I n g r a m s h o w s that Kant is t h e pivotal h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e in t h e 
philosophical d e v e l o p m e n t that leads to the Frankfurt School . It is 
Kant's conception of critical philosophy, as well as his a t t a c h m e n t to the 
ideals of the Enlightenment, that place him at t h e fulcrum of the critical 
turn which is traced through Hegel and M a r x on the o n e hand, and 
Nietzsche and Freud on the other, u p to Marcuse, A d o r n o and Horkheimer. 
The Kantian problematic , a s it pertains to critical social theory, was 
to scrut inize the scope a n d limits of rationality. Kant w a s a w a r e that 
m a n y , basking in the aura of Enlightenment h u m a n i s m , failed to consider 
the b o u n d s of reason. His critique showed that rational philosophy must 
be careful not to fall into p a t t e r n s that h a v e b e e n t y p i c a l o f t h e 
philosophical t r a d i t i o n - t o theorize vainly and d o g m a t i c a l l y about that 
which is beyond the human grasp. A s such, he took a good deal of the wind 
out of m e t a p h y s i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n . Hegel f u r t h e r e d this c r i t i q u e by 
d e v e l o p i n g t h e Kantian t ranscendenta l dialect ic into an histor ic ized 
e p i s t c m o l o g y . By evaluat ing k n o w l e d g e in te rms of both its internal 
c o h e r e n c e a n d i ts h i s t o r i c a l e v o l u t i o n , H c g a l e s t a b l i s h e d a 
m e t h o d o l o g i c a l model that b e c a m e "one of t h e g u i d i n g pr inciples of 
critical t h e o r y " (16 ) . This appropriat ion w a s media ted by M a r x , w h o 
developed the historical dialectic into a critique of political e c o n o m y . In 
doing so, Ingram notes, M a r x transformed philosophy into critical social 
science, or, "critical theory proper.'" 
Having situated critical theory in te rms of these key f igures in the 
history of philosophy, Ingram turns to the influence of Sigmund Freud upon 
the first generation of Frankfurt School thinkers. While deeply influenced 
by Marx , they were likewise a w a r e that the dialectic of his. j r y did not 
lead with necessity to a communis t revolution. In o r d e r t o account for this 
obvious fact, they turned to Freud's theory of repression. Ingram puts it as 
follows: "In this respect, Marx ' s analysis of capitalism w a s d e e m e d to be 
necessary but not sufficient. What was needed was a psychological science 
explaining the natural and social dynamics of consciousness as such. Their 
discovery of Freudian psychoanalysis filled this g a p by enabling them to 
a p p r e c i a t e t h e inst inctual d y n a m i c s u n d e r l y i n g i d e o l o g i c a l fa lse 
consciousness" (31) . This supplementation allowed first generat ion critical 
theoris ts to d e v e l o p a sophis t icated form of i d e o l o g y c r i t i q u e that 
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clarified, in many ways, the conditions which circumvented revolutionary 
practice in the first half of the twentieth century. In contrast to orthodox 
marxists of their time, critical theorists focused less on economic patterns 
and more or: state intervention and the "dissemination of ideology." Their 
conclusions tended to be rather bleak: post-liberal capitalism could 
continue indefinitely. 
The introduction of Freud into their analysis, along with their 
perception that Soviet Communism was not communism at all, and the rise 
of fascism in western Europe, dealt a serious blow to first generation critical 
theorists belief in the primary tenet of the Enlightenment: rational 
emancipation. Reason, it would appear, is rather more malleable than 
Kant and company had thought; it can be turned against humankind in a 
manipulative and domineering manner. Ingram writes: 
The most disturbing feature of Freud's prognosis of 
humanity's fate was his belief that reason itself operates 
through mechanisms of repression and domination. As we 
shall see, this view struck a sympathetic chord with 
Adorno, Horkhcimer, and Marcusc, regardless of their 
insistence that rational enlightenment was nonetheless 
desirable. . This became the predominant them of the 
school from the forties on (49). 
As rationality came to be viewed in questionable light, the influence of 
Nietzsche, and even more so Max Weber, began to play an increasingly 
important role in the work of the major Frankfurt School figures. 
Rationalization ultimately was equated with nihilism-a general loss of 
meaning and the forfeiture of freedom and dignity. On this score, Weber's 
theory of social action and his analysis of bureaucratic rationality proved 
most useful in fleshing out the critique of modern society. Modernity 
represented, for the Frankfurt school, both the possibility of human 
emancipation and a set of systemic imperatives that prohibit its 
realization. This paradox, which Weber called the "iron cage," and 
Horkhcimer and Adorno referred to as the "dialectic of enlightenment," 
ultimately undercut the school's faith in interdisciplinary science and 
forced them to rethink the relationship of theory to practice. 
These discussions of the relationship between critical theory and the 
sources from which it draws make up the first three chapters of Critical 
Theory and Philosophy. The next four chapters focus on particular figures 
in the Frankfurt School tradition, illuminating the importance of their 
contributions to contemporary theory. One of the highlights in this 
segment of the book is the account Ingram provides of the work of Hcrbet 
Marcusc-thc member of the school to whom the book is dedicated as a 
memorial. This lucid analysis demonstrates the way in which Marcusc's 
work deviated from the pessimism that came to dominate that of Adorno 
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and H o r k h c i m c r . W h i l e c e r t a i n l y not a na ive o p t i m i s t , M a r c u s e 
maintained a Utopian c o m p o n e n t in his thinking which recognized the 
possibility for emancipatory practice. This kept, in a sense, the question of 
Enl ightenment open e n d e d , while preserving and e x p a n d i g on the 
tradition of thinking theory and practice together. Another strong suit of 
this part of the book is the careful rendition that Ingram provides of the 
relations between H a b e r m a s and first generation critical theorist . H e 
pursues this all the way through Habermas' recent work on discourse ethics 
and his interventions into the postmodernism debate. As was the case with 
his d i s c u s s i o n s of e a r l i e r cr i t ical theorist , these c h a p t e r s p r o v i d e 
accessible accounts of very complicated material without watering it d o w n . 
Ingram's text concludes with a chapter on the future of critical theory 
and a postscript on recent work in social philosophy. The former considers 
the limits of rational discourse and the possibilities afforded by aesthet ic 
considerations in terms of generating meaning and sparking e m a n c i p a t o r y 
act ion; the later e x a m i n e s the role of feminism and p o s t m o d e r n i s m in 
relationship to the projects and influences of critical theory. In addition to 
this, there a r c biographical profiles of the key figures discussed in the 
text, along with a bibliography of important terms. 
Critical Theory and Philosophy is a book that could b e put to g o o d u s e 
in several contex ts . As was indicated earlier, it is well suited a s an 
i n t r o d u c t i o n to cr i t ical social theory—both at the g r a d u a t e a n d 
undergraduate level. It is designed to be used with a champion anthology . 
Critical Theory: The Essential Readings, edited by I n g r a m a n d Julia 
Simon-Ingram (Paragon, 1991 , forthcoming). At the s a m e time, h o w e v e r , a 
ra ther interesting philosophical problem is traced through the text that 
m a k e s it of interest to specialists as well . An al ternative to the chosen 
title might be "Kant and the T h e o r y / P r a c t i c e Problem." Ingram s h o w s 
with precision and clarity the w a y in which Kant is c o n s t a n t l y in the 
foreground of the critical enterprise and how this bears on the difficult 
talk of thematizing the relationship between theory and pract ice . His 
explication of this important facet of recent social theory is sufficiently 
detailed and sophisticated enough to make it important reading for a n y o n e 
doing research in the fields of social theory and political philosophy. M y 
cri t ic isms of Critical Theory and Philosophy a r c minor . An e x h a u s t i v e 
bibliography would be helpful as would be indcxical references located 
within the glossary. These drawbacks , however don't inhibit the v a l u e of 
text. It is a c learly written, carefully organized introduction to critical 
theory that is equally stimulating to the already initiated reader . Ingram 
both readily a c c o m p l i s h e s and e x c e e d s in a theoretically s t imulat ing 
fashion the objectives of this valuable book. 
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God, The Devil And The Perfect Pizza, by Trudy Covicr. Ontario and New 
York: Broadview Press, 1989. 198 pages. Reviewed by Clarence Sholc 
Johnson, Spelman College. 
In the preface to this book, Covicr states her conviction that the 
apparently imponderable questions of philosophy can be presented in a 
way that can be "both enlightening and entertaining to think about them." 
I believe that the book upholds that conviction and, even despite some 
weaknesses, offers a resounding "Yes" to the question whether philosophic 
material '•an be presented to the beginner in a non-intimidating way. 
Accordingly, I will begin by saying that God, The Devil And The Perfect 
Pizza is a pcdagogically sound book and as such I recommend it as a 
valuable non-technical, yet sophisticated, introduction to some of the main 
questions with which philosophy has been concerned throughout the ages. 
The book is divided into eight segments. (There are no traditional 
chapter divisions, but more on this later.) Among the topics Covicr 
presents arc the following: whether computers can be said to think; the 
problcm(s) of personal identity; the free-will/determinism debate; 
Ansel m's version of the ontological argument; and conscience as a basis for 
morality. What makes Covicr's presentation of some of these topics 
exciting, and therefore gives the book the distinctive attribute of being 
readable, is her adoption of an informal style. She employs the dialogue 
and narrative forms as well as some illustrative cartoons. In choosing the 
dialogue and narrative forms as the media through which to present the 
matters examined Covicr, in the tradition of past masters like Plato and 
Berkeley, wishes to strip the discussions from the customary tension that 
hovers around philosophical arguments. In this connection, it is no accident 
that she uses language that is simple and straightforward and sometimes 
draws upon situations and experience with which the contemporary reader 
is familiar. Let me now attempt to illustrate some of these features of the 
book by commenting on a few of the issues discussed. 1 will begin with the 
segment from which the book derives its title. 
This segment, spanning nineteen pages in all (pp. 46-65), deals with 
Ansclm's version of the ontological argument. Covicr's exposition of the 
argument, especially of Ansclm's reductio against the Fool, its direct and to 
the point. Covier makes very palpable the contradiction that would 
follow, according to Anslcm, upon denying the existence of Cod (pp. 47-49). 
This is the point that is sometimes articulated in the question "Why must 
something c i s t rather than nothing?" The reader cannot but grasp the 
necessity of Cod's existence. 
Caunilo's Perfect Island objection to the ontological argument is recast 
in terms of corresponding arguments for the most Perfect Pizza and for the 
Devil (pp. 52-54 and 56-60). If from my thinking of the Creates! 
Conceivable Being it follows that such an entity exists then it should 
follow from my conceiving of the most perfect pizza that such a pizza 
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exists. However, the most perfect pizza exists only in my mind. By parity 
of reasoning Cod, qua the Greatest Conceivable Being, exists only in the 
mind. To this argument the reply is given that "Cod is unique. The idea of 
Cod is special" (p. 54)—precisely what Ansclm seeks to establish. This 
important characteristic of God, a central feature of the ontological 
argument, had been registered right at the beginning of the discussion (p. 
46). Wc also have the thesis, although not developed, th; * a version of 
the ontological argument for the existence of the Devil seems consistent 
with religious belief. The argument here is given an unorthodox and 
provocative application. 
Another important topic Covier examines is whether computers can be 
regarded as thinking entities (pp. 1-18). Here Covicr articulately presents 
the common resistance to the idea that computers can think, wherein 
thinking entails being both conscious and self-conscious. Consciousness is 
manifested in such acts as breaking rules, trying to win games, pretending, 
cheating, and knowing that one docs these things etc. We are told that 
conscious acts of the kind mentioned are distinctively human, and that only 
to humans, qua intelligent beings and hence legal entities, are civil, legal 
and moral rights ascribable. In the course of the discussion some major 
philosophical questions are raised, but only superficially treated. For 
example, questions about the role of language in fermenting the mistake of 
ascribing cognitive states to machines; and questions about the 
intelligibility of the term 'artificial intelligence*. We also have a brief 
examination of Turing's Imitation Came (pp. 10-12). 
Covicr docs present the issues in this segment with considerable 
clarity—although on some rare occasions it is very difficult to distinguish 
the respective positions of the disputants (pp. 14-15, for example). 
However, she seems too anxious to want to resolve the main problem in 
favor of the position that computers cannot by their very nature be thinking 
entities (pp. 17-18). Thus, the character Jan, having catalogued the rights 
that (she believes) computers ought to have if they were intelligent beings, 
revives the original question with which the discussion had commenced by 
asking "after all this does the computer cheat when it plays with 
Shelley?" To which Robin, the other disputant, peremptorily responds 
"Not really. Well, not the way people cheat anyway" (p. 17, emphasis in 
text). This sudden acquiescence of Robin who, incidentally, had been 
intransigent in defence of the position that computer behavior is 
cognitivcly-dircctcd, transforms what had otherwise been a smooth and 
natural exchange of different points of views into a sudden straight-
jacketed, forced and unnatural agreement. One cannot help thinking that, 
in this discussion, Covicr tries to inject her own belief as the final word, a 
procedure that markedly contrasts with, for example, John Perry's 
treatment of the nature of the problem of personal identity in A Dialogue 
on Personal Identity and Immortality. As personal identity is among the 
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topics Covicr treats I will now consider her presentation of the nature of 
the problem. 
Covicr poses a problem of personal identity in the form of the question 
"What Makes Selves?" (pp. 79-104). Roughly, the discussion has a two-
part structure. In the first part (pp. 80-92) a materialist version of the 
mind is presented and with it the bodily criterion of personal identity 
delineated. In the second part (pp. 92-104) some version of a non-
materialist theory of a person is offered and, consequently, the memory 
criterion of personal identity outlined. The discussion is interspersed with 
problems about multiple personalities and the implications of brain-
transplant experiments on the issue of personal identity. 
But this is the worst segment of the book. Despite the semblance of a 
structure I have managed to read into the text, overall the discussion here 
lacks focus. There docs not seem to be a clear logical progression of thought. 
Covicr offers no detailed organised presentation of the competing positions, 
and the arguments advanced, to resolve the problem of personal identity. 
One also constantly hears of a self but, other than the materialist account 
proposed by the character Chris, there is no developed non-materialist 
conception of the self. Such a theory of the self ought all the more to have 
been given because of the tacit even if false supposition in the book that 
only a non-materialist can subscribe to the memory criterion of personal 
identity. (Would Covicr want us to believe that Hume, for example, 
advances a memory criterion of personal identity because he subscribes to a 
non-materialist theory of the mind?) 
Happily, Covicr is able to redeem herself in the remainder of the 
book, especially in her crisp account of the free-will/determinism 
controversy (pp. 19-45) presented under the title of The Sperm, The Worm, 
and Free-will", and of her concise and illuminating discussion of 
axiological issues under the title of "Conscience" (pp. 126-55) and in three 
captivating allegorical stories subsumed under the title "A Sequence of 
Events" (pp. 159-92). In her examination of theoretical issues about the 
nature of morality Covicr reviews standard positions such as relativism, 
subjectivism and univcrsalism. In addition, she gives a contemporary 
flavor to the question, first raised by Socrates in the Euthyphro, whether 
morality can be derived from religion. The contemporary appeal here is 
Covicr's use of the event that the media dubbed the Salmon Rushdie 
Affair to illustrate Socrates' concern in the exchange with Euthyphro. 
Like Euthyphro, the late Ayatollah Khomcni may well be wrong in 
thinking that Cod will sanction as morally right his act of putting a price 
on Rushdie's head for, in his view, Rushdie's alleged denigration of Islam 
in the book Satanic Verses. 
In "A Sequence of Events," Covicr uses allegories to illustrate the issues 
raised in and by the Prisoner's Dilemma, namely, that rational self-
interested pursuit docs not always in the long run leave one better off than 
if one cooperated with others, wherein a precondition of such cooperation is 
BOOK REVIEWS 85 
communication. In reading these stories, one cannot but think of the mutual 
distrust that led to the Cold War and of the distrust that has always 
permeated arms negotiations. Covicr also raises, from a moral point of 
view, serious environmental concerns about the destruction of the ozone 
layer and the proliferation of sulphur dioxide in the atmosphere that 
results in acid rain. And she concludes the book with a synopsis of the key 
concerns of each segment and of the persons and situations that influenced or 
inspired her in writing them. 
The book deals with a wider range of issues than I have space to 
comment on. Because I have no doubt that students will find the material 
stimulating I have prescribed the book as one of two texts in my 
Introductory course. However, I must say that a revised edition of the book 
is in order if only to correct blemishes in the form of omissions, typos and 
grammatical errors. For example, the verb "are" is missing in the sentence 
"And there lots of other new things too" (pp. 13-14). The indefinite article 
is missing in the sentence "Even computers would have better chance of 
having free will than sperm, I think" (pp. 19-20). There is a grammatical 
error in the phrase "Along with twenty or so other people who also started 
to walked out" (p. 33). And there is one too many 'or'-exprcssions in the 
sentence "And it's hard to understand how William or Jimmy or can be 
selves because they can't connect ideas and conversations" (p. 95). Wc also 
have an inept punctuation in the sentence T h e personality can't be just a 
matter of how the brain and body, are because there could be different 
personalities in the same brian" (p. 88). In correcting these mistakes Covier 
should seize the opportunity of providing conventional chapter divisions so 
that readers can make references more easily to chapters instead of to 
segments or discussions (as I have done). 
Bergsonism, by Cillcs Delcuze. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habbcrjam. New York: Zone books, 1988. 131 pages. Reviewed by Justin J. 
Hernandez, Conception Seminary College, Conception, Missouri. 
This book, first published in France in 1966 as he Bergsonisme, is an 
admirable addition to the relatively few in-depth studies of Bergson to be 
seen in recent years. Readers should take note, however, that Delcuze 
presupposes some familiarity with Time and Free Will and Matter and 
Memory, the two Bcrgsonian works drawn upon most heavily. Only in the 
final chapter arc the results of Dcleuzc's meticulous analysis of duration 
and memory brought to bear upon the doctrine of Two Sources of Morality 
and Religion and Creative Evolution, the two works by which students of 
philosophy have most likely been introduced to Bergson. 
One of Dcleuzc's personal aims is to exonerate Bergson from the charge 
that he was not a rigorous thinker or that the coherence of Bcrgsonism is 
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only as strong as the cluster of images and analogies which arc so prominent 
a feature of Bcrgson's philosophical method and style. Delcu/c 
thoroughly examines how Dergson understood the notion of duration 
methodologically (intuition), cpistcmologically (memory), and 
ontologically (elan vital). 
Chapter 1, "Intuition as Method," presents what Deleuzc sees as three 
methodological rules of Bcrgsonian intuition: 1. distinguishing true from 
false problems and showing the false ones to be the result of bad analysis of 
a composite reality. 2. rediscover the qualitative differentiation in the 
real, and 3. state and solve problems in terms of time rather than space. 
This third rule seems to be a kind of corollary of the second, for time must be 
thought of in terms of duration and qualitative multiplicity 
('heterogeneity' and 'differentiation' arc sometimes used interchangeably 
for 'multiplicity'), rather than in terms of the quantitative multiplicity of 
space. 
Chapter 2, "Duration as Immediate Datum," is the occasion for 
drawing the distinction between two kinds of multiplicity-discrete and 
virtual (continuous), and giving an account of their difference. Duration is 
of the latter sort and is exemplified in realities such as movement, time, 
and memory (hence, the past). 
Chapter 3, "Memory as Virtual Co-Existence," is the heart of the book. 
Dclcuze is convinced that Matter and Memory is Bcrgson's most important 
work, for it is here that Bcrgson began to work out the broader ontological 
implications of his work on the psychology of time and on mental disorders 
affecting memory. Bcrgson's analysis of memory of the past, with his 
notion of the preservation of co-existing but differently contracted levels of 
the complete past, leads him to view reality in its entirety as a kind of 
contraction and relaxation of duration. 
Chapter 4, "One or Many Durations?", discusses how Bcrgson's theory 
of pure memory is at once a kind of pluralism, if not dualism, resulting in a 
novel monism. Deleuzc wonders how consistent Bergson can be in this, but 
docs not go into any critical detail. 
The final chapter, "Elan Vital as Movement of Differentiation," tics 
in the preceding analysis to Bcrgson's position in Two Sources and Creative 
Evolution, elucidating the role of matter in the actualization of duration's 
virtual totality in divergent directions. 
Even though Dclcuzc's superb exposition of memory-duration brings 
together several strands of Bcrgson's thought, this book is not a general 
introduction to Bcrgson's thought. I would only recommend it to one with 
some acquaintance with the primary sources. Dclcuze writes from a 
perspective completely sympathetic to the foundations of Bergsonian 
philosophy, perhaps overly so. For, apart from a few questions 
periodically raised about the consistency of some of Bcrgson's conclusions 
with his presuppositions, Dclcuzc's account is devoid of critical 
assessment. The only other weakness worth mentioning is perhaps an 
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inadequate historical background against which to appreciate the 
contemporaneity of the specific problems upon which Bergson chose to 
focus. One exception to this lack is the historical context of Einstcinian 
theory of time which is provided when Delcuze discusses Bcrgson's 
doctrine of a single, identical time. 
Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society, by Merold Westphal. 
Mercer University Press, 1987, 129 pages. Reviewed by Roy Martinez, 
Spclman College. 
It is part of Wcstphal's merit that in this book he succeeds in 
presenting Kierkegaard as a serious thinker who can, and should, be 
considered as being relevant to contemporary issues: philosophical, 
religious, and socio-political. There is a standard way of rendering 
Kierkegaard to the reading public, i.e., as the irrationalist architect of the 
three stages of existence: aesthetic, ethical, and religious; and as the 
advocate of the solitary self. The apolitical implications of an individual 
ensconced within its own self-imposed confines is usually offered as solid 
and compelling evidence that the thought of Kierkegaard is essentially 
antisocial in structure. Wcstphal's work vigorously vitiates such 
misrepresentation. In addition, he discloses Kierkegaard as a man who 
knows both the possibilities and the bounds of reason, and the relationship 
that obtains between reason and an existence lived under the auspices of 
faith. 
The book is composed of seven essays, six of which have already 
appeared in print. Each essay corresponds to a chapter. The last 
composition, "Inwardness and Ideology Critique in Kierkegaard's 
Fragments and Postscripts," however, was presented to the conference on 
Kierkegaard and Contemporary Philosophy at St. Olaf College in October, 
1985, and is being published in this volume for the first time. Note should 
be taken of the author's admission that although he has written more on 
Hegel, to whom his intellectual debts are enormous, it is Kierkegaard who 
has influenced Wcstphal's thinking more than any other writer (vii). This 
state of affairs led him to the discovery that "the concepts of ideology and 
the sociology of knowledge were first worked out in the 1840s, not just by 
Marx but also by Kierkegaard." He writes, furthermore:, that: 
since the terminology growing out of the Marxist 
tradition has become standard for talking about 
knowlcdgcd as social estimation and the resulting 
dimensions of false consciousness involved in this, the 
presence of essentially the same discoveries in 
Kierkegaard has not been fully appreciated. 
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That is why "Kierkegaard's critique of reason was all too frequently 
misinterpreted in 'existentialist' and 'irrationalist* terms." Also, "the 
Reason befr-c which Kierkegaard refused to bow down in worship was in 
his eyes an historically specific form of human deviousness." In fact, 
"discovering the hcrmcneutics of suspicion and the critique of ideology in a 
thinker as passionately religious as Kierkegaard," persuaded Westphal 
"that the fundamental insights of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud were not the 
monopoly of atheistic unbelief." It is thus that "the idea of the religious 
philosopher in a prophetic mold began to emerge" in the mind of our author 
(vii). 
The first chapter, entitled "Prolegomena to Any Future Philosophy of 
Religion That Will Be Able to Come Forth as Prophecy" treats 
Kierkegaard as the philosopher of religion according to the model of the 
biblical prophet rather than as a scientist, in the sense that the latter 
functions in terms of episteme and Wissenschaft. In this essay, however, 
Kierkegaard makes only cameo appearances, as Westphal is so careful to 
indicate (viii). The second chapter battens on the theme of the first, and 
expatiates on it with the kind of perspicacity and scholarship 
characteristic of Westphal's style. He takes stock of Kierkegaard's 
discomfort with Christian apologetics. Moreover, he shows how this 
uneasiness on the part of Kierkegaard is merely indicative of the lattcr's 
dissatisfaction with the effort of apologists such as Augustine, Anselm, and 
Aquinas to make Christianity reasonable. According to Westphal, 
Kierkegaard is skeptical about any endeavor that renders the teachings of 
Christ submissive to the rule of reason, especially when this reason proves 
to be an ahistorical one, as is implied in the thoughts of the three 
theologians mentioned above. 
Thcmatically, chapter three differs from the first two in that it 
focuses on social criticism. Hence, it is appropriately entitled 
"Kierkegaard's Politics." The author introduces the essay with reference 
to Augustine's The Soliloquies, where the Church Father carries on the 
following dialogue with Reason. 
A. 1 desire to know Cod and the soul. 
R. Nothing more? 
A. Nothing whatever. 
What Westphal wants to drag into the light of day is the intensity of 
the individual's direct relation to Cod not only in The Soliloquies, but also 
as this dimension of religiosity is manifested in Confessions. Given that 
Kierkegaard is traditionally associated with this kind of insularity, our 
author undertakes to combat any spiritual affinity with Augustine that 
fosters an asocial existence in the guise of a Cod-relationship. Here 
Westphal reverts to his Hegelian scholarship in order to present a 
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Kierkegaard who construes human existence in terms of dialectical 
individualism: T h e first step toward understanding Kierkegaard's 
politics is to recognize that he shares with Hegel this conception of spirit 
and the dialectical individualism contained therein. Being dialectical, 
this individualism is a social theory of human experience, inherently 
political in a broad sense. Kierkegaard's task, as he sees it, is to rescue this 
theory of what it is to be human, and its corresponding practice, from a 
Hegelian philosophy that is insufficiently faithful to it and form a society 
of which Hegel's philosophy is an all too faithful expression" (32). At 
this junction, I must say that although this is not the place to explain why, 
I do not share the confidence with which the author associates 
Kierkegaard's thought with Hegel on this matter. 
Chapter four is judiciously entitled "Kierkegaard's Sociology." What 
is meant by sociology, which is observable throughout his writings, is 
Kierkegaard's account of the massification of society, i.c., the emergence of 
mass society,!he crowd, the public, the herd. In this sense, Westphal finds 
it apt to link Nietzsche and Kierkegaard together as spiritual 
contemporaries: "From Nietzsche's perspective, the herd is born of a 
passion for leveling, which has its own origin in a resentment and envy 
that religion masks as the ideals of justice and equality. . . . The 'herd' is 
Nietzsche's name for the disease that occurs when people only 
incompletely break free from Christianity, retaining its morality while 
repudiating its metaphysics" (43). Although Kierkegaard's diagnosis and 
prescription arc equally spiritual, he differs radically from the preceding 
view. T h e hcrd-this is a term he also uses to talk about mass society-is 
the offspring of a passionless age, committed only to self-interest. The 
envy that generates leveling betrays the increasingly total absence of 
ideals from social life, though a lot of talk about Cod remains" (44). This 
essay, together with "Inwardness and Ideology Critique in Kierkegaard's 
Fragments and Postscript," arc by far my favorite pieces in this volume In 
them, Wcstphal is at his best as a Kierkegaard scholar. 
For purposes of space, I shall waive an exposition of, and comments on, 
chapters five and six, which arc respectively entitled "Abraham and 
Hegel," and "Kierkegaard and the Logic of Insanity." This then brings me 
to the final chapter in this collection of superb compositions. "Inwardness 
and Ideology Critique in Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript" treats 
specifically of Kierkegaard's epistcmology. In it, the author undertakes to 
combine a Lutheran understanding of Reason, i.e., "the noetic effects of sin, 
with essential insights of the sociology of knowledge to produce a 
theologically grounded critique of the society in which he lived" (105). 
Here Wcstphal manages to show how the concerns of Kierkegaard, as they 
were expressed about a hundred and fifty years ago, can be fruitfully 
associated with the interests and intellectual endeavors of major 
contemporary thinkers such as Habermas, Ricocur, John Rawls, Hannah 
A rend t, Rudolf Otto, and Maclntyrc. Were I to go on, I fear that there 
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would be no reason for the prospective reader to peruse Kierkegaard's 
Critique of Reason and Society, an original work on Kierkegaard in an area 
where more scholarship is wanting. For aught I know, this is a book that 
must be read by any serious student of Kierkegaard's works. 
